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THE ROLE OF MARKET PRICE IN THE INVESTMENT
VALUE THEORY*
A SIMPLIFICATION proceeding under Section 11 of the Public Utility Hold-
ing Company Act 1 is one of the settings for the ritual of corporate reor-
ganization.2 A simplification plan must establish a capital structure for the
simplified corporation on the basis of its estimated future earnings.3 And
the plan normally provides for exchange of the old securities in return for
cash or securities of the simplified corporation. Under the Holding Company
Act the simplification plan must be "fair and equitable." 4 This directive
means, the Supreme Court has held,' that the strict priority rule of the
Boyd case 6 is applicable. Each senior security holder must be "fully com-
pensated" before a junior security can participate in the simplified corpora-
tion. The Supreme Court further declared in the Otis and Central Illinois
cases7 that the value of the preferred stock to be compensated under the
Boyd rule was not to be measured exclusively by liquidation rights or face
value." Instead, the Court has required that a security be compensated for
its so-called investment or going concern value.9 A particular security's
* Niagara Hudson Power Corp. v. Leventritt, 19 U.S.L. WEEK 4091 (U.S. January
9, 1951).
1. 49 STAT. 803 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79(k) (Supp. 1950). This section's aim is sim-
plification of the large utility holding company systems in line with operational optimum
and geographic integration. For a full discussion of Section 11 and its legislative history,
see Shaw, Public Utility Holding Company Act, Corporate Simplifications and Geographic
Integration under Section 11, 36 Micn. L. Rnv. 1360 (1938).
2. Other settings are Chapter X, 52 STAT. 883 (1938), as amended 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-
676 (1946), Chapter XI, 52 STAT. 905 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 701-99 (1946), and Section 77,
49 STAT. 911 (1935), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1946), of the Bankruptcy Act; and Section
20(b) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 62 STAT. 162 (1948), 49 U.S.C. § 20b (Supp. 1949).
3. Otis & Co. v. SEC, 323 U.S. 624,630 (1944).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 79(k)(e) (Supp. 1950).
5. Otis & Co. v. SEC, 323 U.S. 624 (1944); SEC v. Central Illinois Securities Corp.,
338 U.S. 96 (1949); Dodd, Preferred Shareholders Rights-The Engineers Public Service Com-
pany Case, 63 HARv. L. REv. 298 (1949).
6. Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913). See Swaine, Reorganization of
Corporations: Certain Developments of the Last Decade, 27 COL. L. REv. 901 (1927).
7. See note 5 supra.
8. In the Otis case the Court pointed out that the reason for the inapplicability of the
charter provisions ". . . does not lie in the fact that the business of the utility continues
in another form. That is true of bankruptcy and equity reorganizations. It lies in the fact
that Congress did not intend that its exercise of power to simplify should mature rights
created without regard to the possibility of simplification of the system structure, which
otherwise would only arise by voluntary action of stockholders or, involuntarily, through
action of creditors." 323 U.S. 624, 638.
9. While the Otis case rejected charter liquidation preferences as a basis for asset
distribution, it was not until SEC v. Central Illinois Securities Corp., 338 U.S. 96 (1949),
that the Supreme Court announced the investment or going concern value theory. When
securities are to be surrendered for cash, the investment value criterion is the cost of re-
investment in a security whose risk and earning e-xpectancy are comparable to the old
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value is determined by the amount of the reasonably forseeable earnings
of the corporation it would have been able to command had the corporation
been allowed to continue operations. Until recently, however, it has been
unclear whether a simplification plan under the Holding Company Act can
eliminate a class of securities which have a market value.
In Niagara Hudson Power Corp. v. Leventritt,10 the Supreme Court, re-
solving a conflict between two circuits," upheld the elimination of perpetual
stock purchase warrants despite a showing of present market value.' 2 In
both cases the SEC had evaluated the warrant issues at zero.' 3 Estimating
the corporations' prospective earnings, the Commission concluded that
there was no reasonable expectation that the market price of the stock would
security prior to the simplification proceeding. To illustrate this the court offered the test
of what a "willing buyer would pay a willing seller in today's market" (338 US 96 at 144).
While this suggests use of market values as indices of going concern value it is clear from
the context that the kind of market values to which the court refers are only those based
on rational earning expectations. Lest there be any doubt on this score the court warns at
page 146 that "the Commission would be wrong in selecting as a basis for valuation, ab-
normal or highly speculative market values. .. ."
For examples of the application of the investment value theory to reorganizations under
§ 20(b) of the Interstate Commerce Act, see Lehigh Valley RR Co. Securities Modification,
271 I.C.C. 553 (1949); Boston & Maine RR Securities Modification, 275 I.C.C. 397 (1950).
A dictum in the Niagara decision may presage the extension of the investment value
theory to reorganizations under § 77 and Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. At the end of
its opinion (19 U.S.L. WEEK at 4094), the Court stated: "Moreover, we find no lack of
authority in analogous fields of reorganization for sustaining the general principle that a
class of securities may go unrecognized in a reorganization when informed estimates of
future earnings indicate that they have no investment value," citing in a footnote Group of
Institutional Investors et al. v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523 (1943) (pro-
ceeding under § 77), and Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1940)
(proceeding under § 77B, the predecessor of Chapter X).
10. 19 U.S. L. WEEK 4091 (U.S. January 9, 1951).
11. Niagara Hudson Power Corp. v. Leventritt, 179 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1949); In re
Commonwealth and Southern Power Corp., 184 F.2d 81 (3rd Cir. 1950).
12. The use of perpetual warrants became fashionable during the 20's when fixed in-
come securities were relatively unpopular due to post-war inflation. In order to make such
securities more popular they were either made convertible to common stock, or warrants
to buy common were issued along with them. This package deal gave an investor speculative
opportunity without the risk of actually investing in common stocks. Warrants are also
used to compensate key personnel, a practice on which Congress has recently conferred
special tax advantages. See § 130A of the Internal Revenue Code, added in the 1950
revision. When warrants are issued with securities, the set price at which the holder is
entitled to purchase stock is virtually always considerably in excess of the market price when
the warrants are issued. GRAHAu & DODD, SEctrrl ANALYSis 258-9, 554-5, 568-70 (1934).
See also Garner & Forsythe, Stock Purchase Warrants & "Rights", 4 So. CALIF. L. REv. 269
(1930).
The motives in issuing warrants to executives may be primarily incentive and second-
arily compensation. The exercise price of warrants issued to executives may be set at or
very close to the stock's market price. See, generally, Baker, Stock Options for Executives,
19 HARV. Bus. REv. 106, 112, Table 1 (1940).
13. SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 9270, p. 10, 1949; id. No. 8633, p. 7, 1948.
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exceed the warrant exercise prices in the forseeable future. 14 Thus the
warrants would not be translated into common stock and share in corporate
earnings. Put differently, this means that the equity available to the com-
mon stockholders after senior claims had been satisfied was not fully com-
pensatory.15 Therefore no equity or value was left for the warrants. The
warrant holders pointed to the fact that immediately prior to the simpli-
fication proceedings the warrants had a positive value on the market. 16
This value, they argued, should be recognized by the SEC. Upon appeals
14. In the Niagara case the warrant exercise price was $42.86 per share of stock. Since
the company's formation its stock had never sold above 1814 and had sold as low as Ys.
Just prior to the simplification it was about $12. The SEC estimated foreseeable earnings
at $1.39 per share of common annually. On the liberal assumption that the common stock
might sell at 15 times consolidated earnings, it would require earnings per share of $2.86 to
approximate the exercise price of $42.86 per share. Such earnings would represent an in-
crease of 106% over that which the SEC found reasonably foreseeable. Brief for the SEC,
p. 9, In re Niagara Hudson Power Corp., 179 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1949).
The Commonwealth & Southern warrants had an exercise price of $30. The SEC earn-
ings estimate per share was approximately 60c. At this rate it would require capitalization
of the common at 50 times consolidated earnings in order to attain a market value of $30.
And in order to attain a price of $30 when capitalized at 15 (a liberal capitalization rate) the
increase in estimated earnings would have to be roughly 233%. Cf. Brief for the SEC, p. 5,
In re Commonwealth & Southern Corp., 184 F.2d 81 (3rd Cir. 1950). Not only was there an
economic unlikelihood of such earnings, but the Commission in both cases pointed to the fact
that were such earnings actually being made state regulatory commissions would certainly
reduce them by ordering a reduction in rates.
15. Doctrinally, the decision that a class of securities be eliminated because of no pos-
sibility of participating in future earnings is the same as the decision that the class im-
mediately superior to it has not been fully compensated. Practically, it may make a differ-
ence from which end the Commission starts its decision-making process. For example, in
Otis & Co. v. SEC, 323 U.S. 624 (1944), the procedure followed was to decide that the com-
mon stock was entitled to something, that a fair share for them was 5% of the new common,
and that therefore the preferred would be fully compensated by receiving the remaining
95%. A different result, at least as to the amount received by common, if not as to the
decision whether they should get anything, might have been reached if the SEC had first
attempted to determine how much the preferred should receive in order to be fully com-
pensated for each stick in their "bundle of rights," and then simply given what was left to
common. See also Boston & Maine RR Securities Modification, 275 I.C.C. 379 (1950), under
§ 20(b) of the Interstate Commerce Act, where the ICC used both approaches in the same
case.
16. Perpetual options will always have a market value in excess of zero as long as a
spark of life remains in the corporation. The operations of any corporation no matter what
its present condition may become profitable at some time in the future. Such a hope will
always be given a value on the market. See BERLE & MEArs, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 183 (1932).
The Niagara warrants prior to the simplification were selling for about $3 and the
common stock at $16. Brief for Respondent, p. 38, Niagara Hudson Power Corp. v.
Leventritt, 19 U.S.L. WEnx 4091 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1951).
The Commonwealth warrants sold at 2, with a common stock price of about 4Y8. Brief
of Appellant, p. 21, In re Commonwealth & Southern Power Corp., 184 F.2d 86 (3rd Cir.
1950).
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the third circuit in one case agreed with the SEC,17 the second circuit in the
other case with the warrants holders. 18 In a 6 to 2 decision, the Supreme
Court reversed the second circuit.
Narrowly construed, the Supreme Court's holding is limited to situations
in which the SEC eliminates entirely a class of securities with present market
value. But the Court's reasoning is equally applicable to a situation in which
the Commission's finding of investment value, while greater than zero, varies
substantially from market price. For the Court felt that "the informed
judgment of the Commission, rather than that of the market" is the ap-
propriate guide to the meaning of "fair and equitable" under the Act, and
that the Commission is not bound "to limit itself precisely to the values
which the market recognizes." 19
As the Court realized, to regard market price as the sole index of going
concern value gives more weight to market price than seems justified. In
the Niagara case, for example, intelligent application of the reasonably for-
seeable earnings test to determine going concern value would require compu-
tations too intricate and intangible for the warrant purchaser to make. The
basic determinant of a warrant's investment value is an appraisal of the
chances of the underlying stock's future appreciation. 2 This, of course,
hinges largely on a determination of the utility's profit-making ability. And
such a determination requires matching estimated gross income against
current and anticipated obligations and expenses. Area potential, the
growth of the national economy, future price tendencies, the impact of
atomic energy, and utility regulation policies are among the additional
applicable considerations.21
Apart from earning power of the utility, appraisal of the underlying
stock's appreciation potential depends on the amount of dividends it can
expect. Here, consideration must be given to the potential dilutionary
effect on future profits created by warrants. A warrant when exercised and
transformed into stock immediately begins to participate in profits. But the
capital increment created by its exercise may not add to earnings for some
time. Since this dilution of earnings will act to retard future advances in
stock, any intelligent estimate of the stock's value must take into account the
number of warrants outstanding." In view of the difficulty inherent in these
computations it seems clear that the SEC is better equipped and in a better
position than warrant buyers to make an estimate of warrant values.'3
17. 184 F.2d 81 (3rd Cir. 1950).
18. 179 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1949).
19. 19 U.S. L. WEEE 4093 (U.S. January 9, 1950).
20. BERLE & MEANS, op. cit. supra note 16, at 184 n.54.
21. For a detailed exposition of factors considered in an SEC evaluation, see SEC
Holding Co. Act Release No. 8889, 1949.
22. For a discussion of whether this dilution takes place when warrants are issued or
when they are exercised, see BERLE & MEANS, op. cit. supra note 16, at 184 n.55.
23. The SEC is under a positive duty to make an independent evaluation. Under
§ 24 of the Holding Company Act, its findings of fact are conclusive if supported by sub-
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Actually it is doubtful if warrant buyers even attempt such an estimate. 24
In the Niagara and Commonwealth & Southern cases, the market was prob-
ably gambling in part on the outcome of the simplification proceedings
themselves. More important, it was evaluating the warrant holder's chance
to share in unanticipated earnings. One of the elements of the value of
common stock is the hope that the market's own prediction of a company's
profits is too pessimistic, that unforseen events will bring large gains to the
common stockholders. 25 And warrant holders were paying for a chance at
these speculative earnings.26 The chance may have real value. But since
it is not based on reasonably forseeable earnings it is not a compensable value
under the Public Utility Holding Company ActY.27
It is true that market cash values running into millions of dollars are
destroyed by the SEC plan.28 However, the investment value approach
rests on a Congressional policy that the administration of the Act should
stantial evidence. 49 STAT. 834 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79(x) (Supp. 1950). For a discussion of
the scope of judicial review under this portion of the Act, see Note, 43 ILL. L. REv. 882
(1949).
Evaluation techniques and procedures used are set forth in SEC Holding Co. Act
Releases No. 6083, 1945 and No. 9270, 1949.
24. The SEC urged in argument: "Indeed, we question altogether whether those who
bought and sold option warrants were even attempting to register their appraisal of the
intrinsic advantages of being able to exercise the warrants at any future time. We believe
it more likely that many of them were gambling on future short term gyrations in the market
-as to what other gamblers might pay in the hope of reselling to other gamblers." Brief
for the SEC, p. 16, 179 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1949).
A striking example of this sort of activity in apparently worthless securities is available
daily on the New York Foreign Bond curb market where Czarist Russian Bonds issued in
1919 and 1921 are traded actively. See, e.g., N.Y. Herald Tribune, January 13, 1951, p. 20.
25. As the Court pointed out, "The value of this 'perpetual feature' may be called the
premium value of the warrants as distinguished from their investment value. It takes into
account such possibilities as that of a runaway inflation, an unprecedented accumulation
of undistributed surplus earnings, an unlikely liberalization of standards of public utility
regulation, a surprise discovery of oil on company property, etc." 19 U.S.L. WEEK at 4093.
26. Actually, warrant holders might not be interested in sharing in earnings ai all.
While perpetual warrant issues are rare and experience with them limited, there is strong
indication that they may never be exercised. This is because the low carrying cost of the
long position they represent gives them a trading value which stays slightly ahead of the
gains to be realized by exercising them. Thus, no matter how high the price of the under-
lying stock might go it would be more profitable for the warrant holder to sell the warrant
than to exercise it. Since there is no actual dilution of the stockholders' interests until the
warrant is exercised there may never be a dilution at all where perpetual warrants are in-
volved. BERLE & MEA s, op. cit. supra note 16, at 183. See also HUEBNER, THE STOCK
MARKET (1922).
27. For a case in which perpetual warrants were given a positive value in a simplifica-
tion similar to the Niagara case, see Electric Power and Light Corp., SEC Holding Co.
Act Release No. 8889, pp. 70-74, 1949, affirmed, 176 F.2d 687, 691 (2d Cir. 1949).
28. In the Commonwealth & Southern case this value was set at $12,750,000 by the
appellant. Brief of Appellant, p. 18, In re Commonwealth & Southern Power Corp., 184
F.2d 86 (3rd Cir. 1950). In the Niagara case the figure was $1,500,000. Brief for respondent,
p. 38, Niagara Hudson Power Corp. v. Leventritt, 19 U.S.L. WEEK 4091 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1951).
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not unduly disturb investment values.29 This policy could hardly require
recognition of valueless interests in plans, which would result either in creat-
ing an inflated capital structure for the new corporation, or in affording
senior interests less than their full compensation. Undoubtedly warrant
holders had well considered reasons for purchasing them. But the only
possible part of that decision to buy which offers a valid basis for sympathy
is the hope of directly sharing in reasonably forseeable earnings of the cor-
poration. If that hope existed at all it was clearly so speculative that it
would be grossly unfair to evaluate it at the expense of the common stock-
holders. The SEC determination, as affirmed by the Court, is merely a
familiar aspect of business life in action-part of the price of speculation is
the risk of total loss.
29. "Simplification and reorganization of holding-company structures, making possible
within a reasonable period the practical elimination of the holding company, should be con-
ducted under the Commission's supervision over a period of time to prevent undue losses to
security holders from investment dislocations." S. REP. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
60 (1935). And see note 5 supra.
